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The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  test  for  the  inﬂuence  of  neighborhood  deprivation  on  individual 
unemployment probability in the case of Lyon (France). We estimate a bivariate probit model of 
unemployment and location in a deprived neighborhood. Our identiﬁcation strategy is twofold. 
First, we instrument neighborhood type by the gender composition of household’s children and 
the spouse’s workplace. Second, we use the methodology proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), that 
in our case consists in making hypotheses as to the correlation between the unobservables that 
determine unemployment and the unobservables that inﬂuence the selection into neighborhood 
types. Our results show that the effect of neighborhood deprivation is not signiﬁcantly different 
from zero in the bivariate probit with exclusion restrictions. We also show that a correlation of 
the unobservables as low as ten percent of the correlation of observables is sufficient to explain 
the positive neighborhood effect that is observed when endogeneity is not accounted for. 
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A rapidly growing stream of research in the social interactions literature focuses on neighbor-
hood eects, that is, the impact of neighbors' characteristics and behaviors on individual socio-
economic outcomes (Durlauf, 2004). In particular, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests
that interactions with neighbors are likely to aect individual labor-market outcomes through
peer eects and role models in the human capital acquisition process, attitudes toward work, and
dissemination of information on job opportunities. Arnott and Rowse (1987) show that less-
able learners exert negative externalities on the learning process of other students. B enabou
(1993) argues that the cost of education acquisition may be inuenced by education decisions
of neighbors. Wilson (1987) explains that the lack of successful role models among older adults
in deprived neighborhoods may inuence youths' motivations and attitudes toward work. The
role of social networks on information about job openings has also been highlighted, especially
for low-skilled workers who often resort to informal search modes such as personal contacts (see
Selod and Zenou, 2006 and Zenou, 2008 for theoretical models). As a consequence, the percent-
age of employed individuals in the neighborhood may inuence other residents' access to job
opportunities (Topa, 2001; Bayer et al., 2005). Finally, the stigmatization of deprived neigh-
borhoods may lead employers to discriminate workers on the basis of their residential location
(territorial discrimination; see Zenou and Boccard, 2000).
Measuring neighborhood eects raises the issue of location choice endogeneity, which gen-
erates correlated eects (Mott, 2001; Durlauf, 2004). Indeed, urban economics has recognized
for long that individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics, labor-market outcomes,
and unobservable traits tend to sort themselves into certain areas of the urban space. There-
fore, studies that do not control for the endogeneity of social group will yield biased results
(Krauth, 2006). The inadequate correction for this bias has been put forward to explain the
great divergence of results obtained by empirical studies (Ginther et al., 2000) and is one of the
major focuses of recent research on neighborhood eects.
This paper aims to test for the existence of neighborhood eects on unemployment focusing
on the endogeneity issue (i) by accounting for the sorting into neighborhoods based on observed
and unobserved characteristics and (ii) by using two dierent and complementary identication
strategies thus providing a robustness test of the results. The application is on French data.
1Indeed, theories highlighting the impact of neighborhood composition on individual labor-market
outcomes have emerged in the context of U.S. metropolitan areas and empirical studies are
numerous in this context. In contrast, empirical evidence on this matter in Europe is recent
and still scarce. Exceptions include Fieldhouse (1999) and Bolster et al. (2007) on Britain,
Dujardin et al. (2008) on Belgium, Andersson (2004) and Galster et al. (2008) on Sweden.1
In France, neighborhood eects have been studied (alongside with spatial mismatch eects) for
Paris (Gobillon and Selod, 2007; Gobillon et al., 2009) and Bordeaux (Gaschet and Gaussier,
2004). However, these French studies do not perfectly deal with the endogeneity of neighborhood
choice, which is the main focus of the present paper.
In the following, we estimate the impact of neighborhood deprivation on individual un-
employment probabilities in Lyon, the 2nd largest French city. In order to take into account
threshold eects, as suggested by Crane (1991), in the relationship between neighborhood de-
privation and individual outcomes, we classify neighborhoods as deprived or not on the basis
of a data analysis step. Then a simultaneous model of unemployment and neighborhood type
is estimated. Two dierent identication strategies are used. In a rst strategy, identication
relies classically on exclusion restrictions. We use the gender composition of household's children
as well as the spouse's workplace as instruments for neighborhood type. This set of instruments
is carefully discussed and their relevance and validity are thoroughly tested. Second, following
Altonji et al. (2005), we estimate this simultaneous probit model with no exclusions but impos-
ing constraints on the correlation of error terms that amount to making hypotheses as to the
intensity of selection into deprived neighborhoods based on unobservables. These assumptions
allow to place bounds to the neighborhood eects on unemployment. To our knowledge, this
application of the Altonji et al. method to the estimation of neighborhood eects is novel, one
exception in a similar spirit being Krauth (2009).
Our results show that living in the 25% most deprived neighborhoods of Lyon signi-
cantly increases unemployment probabilities in a naive probit model that do not control for
the endogeneity of location. However, the eect of neighborhood deprivation is not signicant
anymore once endogeneity is properly dealt with in a simultaneous probit specication with
exclusion restrictions. Moreover, the second identication strategy, based on the correlation
of error terms, suggests that only a small amount of correlation between the unobservables is
1We restrict here ourselves on studies of neighborhood eects on labor-market outcomes exclusively. Note
however that other types of outcomes have been studied in the European context, including France.
2sucient to explain the positive neighborhood eect that is observed when endogeneity is not
accounted for.
The paper proceeds with Section 2 which denes the endogeneity issue and presents the
various identication strategies used in the literature. Section 3 describes the database and gives
a brief description of the spatial structure of Lyon. Section 4 presents our econometric model
and identication strategies. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identication of neighborhood eects
In a widely cited article, Manski (1993) identies three types of mechanisms which explain the
fact that individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly: (i) endogenous
eects wherein an individual's behavior is inuenced by the average behavior in the group, (ii)
contextual eects wherein an individual's behavior is inuenced by the average characteristics
in the group, and (iii) correlated eects, wherein similar behaviors in a group are the result of
exposure to common unobserved factors or of non random group selection.
The goal of contemporaneous work on social interaction eects is to disentangle these dif-
ferent kinds of mechanisms. Indeed, social interaction eects, of which neighborhood eects are
a special case dened on a geographical basis, consist in endogenous and contextual eects, each
of which having dierent policy implications (Mott, 2001; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001).
Correlated eects, if not corrected for, bias the estimates of endogenous and contextual eects
(Dietz, 2002; Durlauf, 2004). Indeed, correlated eects arise because individuals (or households)
are not distributed at random across social groups (or neighborhoods). On the contrary, indi-
viduals self-select into neighborhoods on the basis of their individual characteristics, which are
also likely to inuence the outcome or behavior of interest. Some of these characteristics are
observed and can be controlled for in a simple regression analysis. But others are unobserved
to the researcher (for example, motivations or abilities). This generates a nonzero correlation
between the unobserved determinants of the outcome and unobserved determinants of neigh-
borhood belonging, which is likely to yield biased neighborhood eect estimates. Recent studies
have highlighted the reduction of estimated social interaction eects that stems from correcting
for such biases (Ginther et al., 2000; Krauth, 2006).
3In this context, the objective of this article is to estimate neighborhood eects on unem-
ployment, i.e. contextual eects and endogenous eects together, while purging the bias due to
correlated eects. In doing so, we consider the correction for self-selection into neighborhoods
as a precondition to the estimation of neighborhood eects and we leave the distinction between
endogenous and contextual eects for future research.
Various strategies have been proposed in the empirical literature to correct for non ran-
dom group selection in neighborhood eect studies. Quasi-experimental situations, in which
households are moved from one neighborhood to another through an exogenous governmental
intervention are considered as providing quite reliable estimates of neighborhood eects. The
best-known examples of such interventions are the Gautreaux Program and the Moving To Op-
portunity Program (see Oreopoulos, 2003, for a review). While such studies have been able
to show the existence of neighborhood eects on teenagers behaviors and outcomes, it seems
that neighborhood eects on adult labor-market outcomes are of much lower importance, if any
(Kling et al., 2007; Katz et al., 2001). Another strand of literature uses longitudinal data and
estimates neighborhood eects through xed-eect models, thus allowing to control for individ-
ual unobserved characteristics that are constant across time (Weinberg et al., 2004; Galster et
al., 2008). For example, Weinberg et al. (2004) nd that hours worked are inuenced by neigh-
borhood characteristics but comparison of results with and without xed-eects suggests that
naive estimates are strongly overestimated. A nal approach consists in instrumental variables
techniques, i.e. replacing the neighborhood characteristic by a set of variables that are correlated
with the latter but not with the unobserved determinants of the outcome. Unfortunately, nding
a good instrument is a dicult task. Most studies up to now have used instruments dened on
an aggregate basis, in general city-level variables. For example, Foster and McLanahan (1996)
use city-level labor-market conditions as instruments for neighborhood dropout rate in their
study of educational outcomes. Evans et al. (1992) use a similar strategy. Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) study the inuence of city-level segregation level on education and income for blacks,
using public nance and topographic characteristics as instruments. However, such instruments
have been criticized as it is not clear how they can account for neighborhood eects within cities
(Durlauf, 2004) and it is likely that aggregate-level instruments may actually increase biases
(Rivkin, 2001). Instruments dened at the individual level have been used in other research
contexts. For example, Currie and Yelowitz (2000) and Goux and Maurin (2005) estimate the
eect of public housing occupancy and overcrowded housing respectively on educational outcome
4using as instrument the sex composition of children. Dujardin and Goette-Nagot (2009) also
use the sex composition of children to identify the eect of public housing occupancy on unem-
ployment. In a slighly dierent setting, Goux and Maurin (2007) use information on neighbors'
month of birth as an instrument to study the inuence of neighbors on educational outcomes.
We are not aware of any use of such type of instruments in the study of neighborhood eects
on labor-market outcomes.
Besides these strategies to overcome self-selection issues, a stream of research has adopted
a completely dierent perspective which consists in evaluating how large selection based on
unobservables has to be to invalidate naive estimates (as suggested by Glaeser, 1996). Recent
work by Altonji et al. (2002b, 2005, 2008) and by Krauth (2006, 2007) are examples of such
studies. In particular, in the absence of a relevant instrument, Altonji et al. (2002b, 2005) use
the amount of selection on observables as a guide to the amount of selection on unobservables
to bound estimates of the eect of Catholic schools, a clearly endogenous variable with respect
to educational attainment.
As explained in details in Section 4, the present paper builds on the last two identication
strategies highlighted above. In a rst step, we resort to instrumental variables and estimate a
simultaneous model of unemployment and neighborhood type, using instruments dened at the
individual level. In a second step, we use a strategy similar to the one proposed by Altonji et
al. (2005).
3 Data and basic evidence
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper is based on data extracted from the 1999 French
Population Census. It corresponds to a 1:20th sample of individuals for whom detailed per-
sonal and household characteristics are provided (age, gender, education, employment status,
occupational status, household type, etc) along with the characteristics of the other members of
his/her household. In addition, census data are particularly useful in the context of neighbor-
hood eects studies as it is (to our knowledge) the sole dataset in France to provide information
on residential location at a ne spatial scale: the Iris zone. Iris zones are either municipalities if
5those have less than 10,000 inhabitants and subdivisions of around 2,000 inhabitants otherwise.
They have been created in order to represent homogeneous entities in terms of housing and
population. They are generally formed around well identied groups of buildings and respect
frontiers such as main avenues, rivers or railways. They will be called neighborhoods in the
rest of the paper, for the sake of simplicity. In addition to the 1:20th sample, census data also
gathers summary statistics at the neighborhood level, including indicators of the socioeconomic
composition of the population based on exhaustive information. These indicators will be used
in the next subsection to dene a typology of neighborhoods based on the deprivation level, i.e.
the interest variable in our econometric model.
This paper focuses on Lyon, the second largest city in France. Its agglomeration (dened
here by its urban unit) extends over a 958 km2 area and hosts around 1.3 million inhabitants.2
It counts 540 neighborhoods3 which have on average 2,428 inhabitants, a gure more or less
comparable to the size of American Census tracts used in previous studies of neighborhood eects
in the U.S. Lyon is characterized by the existence of pockets of poverty in the close periphery
of its center (the so-called \banlieues") and thus appears to be an adequate case study to test
for the existence of neighborhood eects. Figure 1 maps the percentage of unemployed workers
among labor-force participants at the neighborhood level. In most American cities, central
neighborhoods exhibit higher unemployment rates than peripheral neighborhoods. In Lyon, the
neighborhoods with the lowest unemployment rates are also found in the far periphery, but
Figure 1 shows that the highest unemployment rates are found in the close periphery of Lyon's
municipality and not in the center. The unemployment spatial structure is also quite related
to the distribution of educational levels, professional statuses and ethnic minorities. It is also
strongly related to the location of public housings, which is very typical of French cities where
public housing projects built in the 1970's play a key role in spatially concentrating low-income
households. As a consequence, one can suspect the existence of neighborhood eects aecting
labor-market outcomes of individuals located in these neighborhoods.
2The urban unit, unit e urbaine in French, is a set of municipalities, the territory of which is covered by a
built-up area of more than 2000 inhabitants, and in which buildings are separated by no more than 200 meters.
The urban unit of Lyon consists of 102 municipalities. For practical reasons, we added three municipalities which
are enclosed within the urban unit of Lyon (Quincieux, Saint-Germain-au-Mont-D'Or and Poleymieux-au-Mont-
D'Or).
3A few Iris having less than 200 people had to be deleted for condentiality reasons.
63.2 Denition of deprived neighborhoods
Our empirical model estimates neighborhood eects on unemployment probabilities. We have
thus to dene a relevant measure of neighborhood characteristics. Literature on neighborhood
eects shows that a wide variety of neighbors' characteristics is likely to aect individual un-
employment propensity. Introducing all of them is not desirable because of the high degree
of correlation observed between such variables, which may cause instability in the parameters
and signicance levels (O'Regan and Quigley, 1998). Furthermore, several authors (for exam-
ple, Crane, 1991; Weinberg et al., 2004) suggest the existence of potential threshold eects,
which make the relationship between the level of deprivation and the intensity of neighborhood
eects non linear. Therefore, we don't introduce linearly a deprivation index in the unemploy-
ment equation but rather, and for the sake of simplicity, a dummy variable representing the
classication of a neighborhood as deprived.
Consequently, we build a typology of neighborhoods aiming at reecting for each neigh-
borhood its social composition and the ensuing neighborhood eects that potentially aect
labor-market outcomes. This classication is based on a set of variables chosen in order to ac-
count for the most-often cited mechanisms by which neighborhood might aect unemployment:
distribution of population by educational levels, percentage of executives and blue-collars in the
labor force, percentage of unemployment and long-term unemployment, percentage of household
heads of foreign nationality, and percentage of lone-parent families. Each of these neighborhood
characteristics is likely to aect individual unemployment propensity: high unemployment rates
as well as high rates of foreigners inuence the quality of social networks and decrease infor-
mation on job opportunities; educational levels, income levels (proxied by professional statuses)
and the percentage of lone-parent families are indicators of social and economic (un)success
among neighbors, which generate contagion eects and a lack of role models; in addition, the
percentage of foreign household heads and lone-parent families are often correlated to various
social deviances, which give rise to stigmatization of neighborhoods. Note that we don't seek to
disentangle these dierent mechanisms.
We treat this set of variables by means of standard factorial ecology methods (see for
example Johnston et al., 2004) in order to build a composite indicator of neighborhood depriva-
tion. We rst run a Principal Component Analysis to dene a number of non-correlated factors
summarizing the information carried by these variables. As usual, only factors with eigenvalue
7above 1 are retained, that is in our case, two factors which together account for 90% of the
variance of the initial set of variables (see Table A.1 in Appendix). The deprivation index is
then dened as a linear combination of these two factors, each being weighted by the part of
total variance it explains. The index ranges from -1.08 for the less deprived neighborhood to
2.64 for the most deprived. In order to deal with a dummy variable, we dene cut-o values
on this deprivation index in order to identify the most deprived neighborhoods of Lyon. We
use alternatively cut-o values corresponding to the 35%, 25% and 15% most deprived neigh-
borhoods, corresponding to deprivation index above 0.10, 0.31 and 0.73 respectively. The 25%
classication will be our baseline neighborhood variable and will be used in most analyses, while
the 35 and 15% will be used to test the sensitivity or our results to a move of the classication
threshold.
As can be seen from Figure 2, deprived neighborhoods are spread in dierent parts of
the city, still mostly concentrated in its eastern half. Table 1 shows the main characteristics
of the 25% most deprived neighborhoods, as opposed to the rest of the agglomeration. These
deprived neighborhoods are characterized by high unemployment rates (twice as high as the
average unemployment rate in other neighborhoods), high percentage of foreigners (more than
three times as high as in the rest of the agglomeration), low educational levels and professional
statuses (for example, the percentage of individuals with a university degree is one third of the
average corresponding percentage for other neighborhoods).
3.3 Sample denition and rst evidence
Our joint model of unemployment probability and neighborhood type deals only with couple
households, because the case of single adults suers from a selection bias, young adults being
less likely to form a separate household if they are unemployed. Moreover, the presence of a
spouse gives us characteristics that will be used in the equation of neighborhood type. Finally,
because dealing with women would imply to explain not only unemployment, but also labor-
market participation, our study only concerns male household heads. We select, from the 1:20th
census sample, individuals aged 19 to 64 and participating in the labor-market. Due to data
availability on previous occupation, we delete individuals who never worked, that is only 18
individuals. The nal sample contains 10,473 individuals, all of them being males. Our analysis
therefore does not concern the population of women nor that of young males at the beginning
8of their career.
Table 2 displays the sample statistics by neighborhood type dened with the 25% thresh-
old, for all exogenous variables that will be used in the empirical model. For each explanatory
variable, the percentage of the sample in the category as well as the mean unemployment rate are
provided.4 Deprived neighborhoods host one fth of the individuals in our sample. Compared
to individuals in other neighborhoods, those in deprived neighborhoods are less educated and
have lower occupational statuses.5 Regarding demographic variables, they have the same age
structure but the proportion of foreigners is higher in deprived neighborhoods than in the rest of
the agglomeration. Unemployment rates vary markedly with respect to the socioeconomic pro-
le (younger individuals, foreigners, less educated and lower occupational statuses have higher
unemployment rates), but also with respect to the neighborhood type. On average, individuals
residing in deprived neighborhoods are more often unemployed (11%, against 5% in the rest of
the agglomeration). Moreover, for each socioeconomic category, unemployment rates in deprived
neighborhoods are higher than unemployment rates of the corresponding category in the other
neighborhoods.
This dierenciated unemployment rate depending on neighborhood type raises several
interpretations. First, this could account for neighborhood eects that increase the diculties
encountered by individuals on the labor-market when they live in a deprived neighborhood, such
as peer eects, lack of role models, poor social networks or territorial discrimination. Second,
this could be the consequence of a self-selection eect. Indeed, as rents vary according to the
type of neighborhood, the less successful individuals on the labor market and people with a low
attachment to the labor market are more likely to sort themselves into deprived neighborhoods
(Zenou, 2008). Our econometric analysis is intended to disentangle these two mechanisms.
4Note that these percentages are slightly dierent from those displayed in Table 1. Indeed, our sample consists
only of male heads of couple households aged 19-64, whereas Table 1 corresponds to the whole population.
5In the whole paper, the following education levels will be used: No diploma, At most lower secondary school,
Vocational training, High school nal diploma, University degree. They correspond to the following French
categories: no reported diploma, CEP or Brevet, CAP or BEP, Baccalaur eat, DEUG or above, respectively. As
regards the occupational status, intermediate professions include teachers and related, social and healthcare work-
ers, clergy, civil service middle managers, sales and administrative middle managers, technicians and supervisors.
94 Method
Our empirical model is intended to test for the existence of an eect of neighborhood deprivation
on unemployment. The classical theory of job search ends up in the estimation of unemploy-
ment duration models, whereas the dataset we use only contains information on the current
employment status. We therefore estimate the probability of unemployment. This reduced form
is assumed to represent how the individual's situation aects both the arrival rate of job of-
fers and his reservation wage. As already explained, neighborhood deprivation is endogenous
because unobserved individual characteristics that inuence residential choice are likely to in-
uence labor-market outcomes. To control for endogeneity, we estimate a simultaneous probit
model of unemployment and neighborhood type. Our rst identication strategy is, classically,
to use exclusion restrictions. However, because instrument choice is always questionable, we
consider a second identication strategy, based on totally dierent assumptions, that has been
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005). In a nutshell, this identifying strategy consists in making
assumptions as to the level of selection on unobservables.
4.1 Empirical model and econometric method
The aim of our econometric model is to estimate jointly the unemployment probability and the
probability of living in a deprived neighborhood. We therefore have a bivariate probit formed of
an individual-level equation for unemployment and a household-level equation for the residential
situation. It writes:
8
> > > > > > > > <
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y1 = 1(y2 + X01 + u1 > 0)
































where y1 and y2 are the probability of unemployment and the probability to live in a
deprived neighborhood respectively. X is a vector of exogenous covariates inuencing the two
outcomes (leaving aside the identication issue for the time being). The latent variable deter-
mining unemployment is assumed to be inuenced by the dummy y2 and  is an estimate of the
intensity of neighborhood eects on unemployment probability. As we assume that the sorting
10of households into neighborhood types may be aected by unobserved characteristics inuencing
also unemployment, the correlation term between the residuals of the two probits (u1 and u2)
is supposed to be non-zero and equal to .
This simultaneous probit model includes an endogenous observed discrete variable on its
right hand side (the neighborhood type in the unemployment equation). It amounts conse-
quently to a mixed model. A coherency condition, which imposes a triangular form, has to be
veried in mixed models (Maddala, 1983; Blundell and Smith, 1994). The observed variable
of unemployment cannot therefore be introduced in the neighborhood type equation. However,
unemployment is likely to aect the household's income and therefore the probability to live in
a deprived neighborhood. To account for this inuence, we introduce all the observable char-
acteristics determining unemployment probability in the neighborhood equation. The presence
of unobservables that determine unemployment and therefore inuence neighborhood type is
likely to result in a correlation between the error terms of the two equations. The simultaneous
estimation ensures that this correlation is explicitly dealt with, as the correlation matrix of error
terms is estimated.6
Unemployment is explained, in a classical manner, by individual characteristics relative to
experience (that will be proxied by age and its square to allow for a non-linear eect), education
and previous occupation, because unemployment rates vary with skill level and professional
status. Due to potential discrimination by employers, individual's nationality is included. It is
also supposed to inuence, in conjunction with the spouse's nationality, the access to information
on job opportunities through the network of relatives. Because the spouse's educational level
might be suspected to inuence the individual's participation on the labor market, it is also
included in the unemployment equation.
In the neighborhood equation, the educational levels of the individual and his spouse,
individual's occupational status in previous job and age are proxies for the household's income,
which plays a central role in residential choice. Further, there is some evidence that individuals
of foreign origin are discriminated against on the renting market and are therefore more likely
to be accommodated in public housing and in low-income neighborhoods. Dummies for the
6The relevance of this triangular specication can moreover be supported by the estimation of a reverse
specication, in which the neighborhood type is explained by unemployment and no eect of neighborhood on
unemployment is assumed. The estimation of such a model shows that there is no eect of unemployment on
neighborhood choice, once the eect of observed characteristics is controlled for (results available from the authors
on request).
11individual's and his spouse's nationalities account for these eects.
In summary, X in system 4.1 is a vector of exogenous variables including a constant,
individual's age and its square (expressed as units of ten years), nationality, diploma and previous
occupation as well as the spouse's nationality and diploma (each of them being a set of dummy
variables).







where qij = 2yij   1 is equal to 1 whenever yij is 1 and to -1 whenever yij is 0, subscript i
denotes individual i and 2(:) is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function.
Such a system can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. Endogeneity tests
amount to test the signicance of the correlation coecient of residuals (Greene, 1998). Note
that standard errors have to be corrected for within-neighborhood dependencies to account for
common inuences within neighborhoods, using Huber ajusted standard errors (Wooldridge,
2003).
4.2 Instrumental variable identication
A simultaneous probit model is formally identied based on functional form (Wilde, 2000).
However, it is known that relying on functional form for identication can be misleading and
some restrictions are required to base identication on meaningful grounds.7 We therefore use
exclusion restrictions aimed at providing identication of the neighborhood eect, under the
form of a vector Z of covariates introduced in the equation of y2, which gives:
8
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y1 = 1(y2 + X01 + u1 > 0)
































The goal when choosing an exclusion restriction is to nd a variable that aects the
7See for instance the comparison between 2SLS and bivariate probit methods in Altonji (2002a).
12choice of residential location while not being correlated with the probability of unemployment
conditionally on the other covariates. In French cities, one important determinant of residential
location is accommodation in public housing, which is a strong factor of income segregation.
Indeed, a large part of the public housing stock was built under the form of large projects in city
outskirts and public housing renters are therefore concentrated in specic neighborhoods. Still,
being in public housing cannot be considered, in our views, as exogenous to unemployment.
In a previous paper, we have shown that the gender composition of children inuences the
probability for a household to be accommodated in the public housing sector (Dujardin and
Goette-Nagot, 2009). The rationale for this is that parents having children of dierent genders
are less likely to have a third child and this eect is stronger for those having rst a girl. This
ensues in a lower probability to be housed in the public housing sector and then also in deprived
neighborhoods. Indeed, Table 2 shows that the percentage, among families with at least two
children, of households having rst a girl and then a boy is lower in deprived neighborhoods. The
gender composition of children is therefore likely to inuence location in a deprived neighborhood
and it is our rst instrument. It is however available only for households having two children or
more.
Given the size of the agglomeration, workplace location is also an important determinant
of residential location choice. We build a variable that takes value 1 if the workplace of the spouse
(the individual's workplace not being usable for evident reasons) is in the eastern outskirts, that
is more specically, in the group of municipalities delineated on Figure A.1 in Appendix,8 where
a large part of the deprived neighborhoods is located. The variable takes value 0 when the
spouse does not work or works in other parts of the city. We observe that the household is
more likely, ceteris paribus, to be located in a deprived neighborhood when the spouse works in
the eastern part of the city: the percentage of households in deprived neighborhoods with this
characteristic is 23.0% against 14.1% in other neighborhoods (Table 2); the variable is highly
signicant in a probit model of neighborhood type (Table 3).
We now examine the properties of these two instruments, i.e. their relevance and validity.
We perform this analysis on the basis of linear probability specications of our model, using
8These communes (Vaulx-en-Velin, V enissieux, D ecines, Bron, Saint-Priest, Lyon 8
 arrondissement, Villeur-
banne, Saint-Fons, Feyzin) have been chosen so as to represent the main employment centers in the eastern
outskirts. A small municipality located between D ecines-Charpieu and Saint-Priest has not been taken into ac-
count due to the small number of jobs it has.The 8th district of Lyon's municipality has been included because it
concentrates a lot of jobs.
13a GMM estimation to deal with the heteroskedasticity of linear probability models (see Baum
et al., 2003). In this context, the relevance of the instrument Z means that Cov(y
2;Zj:) 6= 0,
and the validity means that Cov(Z;u1) = 0 with u1 the error term in the interest equation.
The relevance of instruments will be evaluated using classical F-tests performed on the 1st
stage estimation, while the validity will be assessed, in the specications where we have two
instruments, using overidentication tests based on Hansen J statistic, which is adapted to
GMM estimations.
Among our two instruments, only the spouse's workplace can be used on the whole sample.
The gender composition of household's children is a second instrument for the subsample of
families with at least two children. It allows us to perform an overidentication test on this
subsample and thus to assess the validity of the rst instrument.
Beginning with the relevance of the spouse's workplace instrument, the F statistic of
signicance in the rst stage is 28.6 for the whole sample (Table 3, column 2), when a rule of
thumb gives a threshold of 10 for a set of instruments to be considered as strong (Staiger and
Stock, 1997). As to the validity of this instrument, we have to show that the spouse's workplace
is not correlated to the unobservables that aect the individual's probability of unemployment.
We rst note that the communes chosen for the denition of this dummy do not host particularly
low-skilled or temporarily jobs. On the contrary, this area has rms working for instance in the
pharmaceutical sector, in the computer industry and four specialized hospitals. Therefore, it
is not very likely that working in these communes is associated with a low attachment to the
labor market for the spouse or the individual. In our sample, the percentage of unemployed
is even smaller for the individuals whose spouse works in this area (5.6% against 6.6% for the
rest of the population, Table 2), which can be explained by the fact that spouses of employed
workers are more likely to be employed due to assortative mating. However, this eect is
fully explained by the observed characteristics: a simple probit of individual's unemployment
probability shows that when controlling for other covariates, the coecient of the spouse's
workplace is not signicant at any conventional level.9
Considering the subsample of families with at least two children provides us with a second
instrument and thus with a formal validity test of the two instruments. We rst check that
changing the sample does not change the relevance of the spouse's workplace as an instrument.
9P-value 0.23, detailed results available from the authors on request.
14Table 3 (column 4) shows that, although a little less signicant, the spouse's workplace is a strong
enough instrument for the sample of families. Adding the dummy for families having rst a girl
and then a boy decreases the global F statistic (Table 3, column 5), due to the fact that the
girl-boy dummy is signicant at the 10% level only. However, with a F statistic of 12.25, this set
of instruments can be considered as strong enough. Considering now the validity, we can rst say
that the children gender dummy can safely be considered as exogenous, because it is not chosen
by the parents and there is no reason for it to aect the father's unemployment probability.10
We then consider the Hansen J statistic testing the joint validity of the two instruments. The
value of the statistic is 0.53 (p-value 0.47), which indicates that the null hypothesis that the two
intruments are jointly valid can not be rejected. The limits of this kind of tests are known: they
can provide missleading results, as the null of orthogonality may be unrejected when the two
instruments are endogenous but the biases that they induce are of similar sign and magnitude.
However, we claim that performing such a test with two instruments having very dierent logics
and of which one is clearly exogenous (the children gender composition) gives more reliability
to the test.
4.3 Identication  a la Altonji
As recalled above, the bivariate probit with an endogenous covariate is classically identied by
introducing exclusion restrictions. Other types of restrictions can serve as identication means.
As shown in a serie of papers by Altonji et al. (2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2008), it is possible, instead
of relying on potentially disputable instruments, to make assumptions concerning the correlation
between the unobservables determining the outcome and the endogenous variable. Considering
system 4.1, this amounts to place constraints on the parameter  and allows to have a restriction
ensuring the identication of the endogenous variable coecient.
Altonji et al. (2005) present their framework as consisting in making hypotheses as to the
selection into the treatment (the endogenous variable) based on unobservables and seeing how
the estimated eect of the endogenous variable varies depending on these hypotheses. The basic
idea is that the degree of selection on observables into the treatment may be used as a guide for
the degree of selection produced by unobservables. The extreme hypothesis of an equal amount
10See Angrist and Evans (1998) and Goux and Maurin (2005) for the use of this characteristic as a valid
instrument.
15of selection on observables and unobservables allows the identication of a point estimate.
We briey present here the conditions under which an \equal selection" based on ob-
servables and unobservables can be reasonably assumed. The details and justication of these
conditions are formalized in Altonji et al. (2002b). The idea of \equal selection" considers that
the outcome is determined by a set of factors, a part of which only is observable. If this set
is large, so that none of these elements dominates the distribution of the outcome and of the
endogenous variable, and if the observables are randomly selected among this set, then, because
the observables and unobservables are treated symetrically, the treatment has the same relation-
ship to the explained part of the outcome than to its unexplained part. A third hypothesis is
required for equal selection to hold: the regression of y
2 on y
1   y2 (with y
1 and y
2 the latent
variables determining the outcome and the endogenous binary variable respectively) has to be
equal to the regression of the part of y
2 that is orthogonal to X on the corresponding part of
y
1   y2 (see Altonji et al., 2002b, for proof).
Under this set of assumptions, a formal condition is obtained that translates in the bi-





In words, the condition of equal selection on observables and unobservables amounts to placing
a restriction on the correlation coecient of the errors of the bivariate probit, which allows to
obtain a point estimate of the coecient of the endogenous variable. Because the hypothe-
sis concerning the selection on unobservables provides an identifying assumption, no exclusion
restriction is required and the bivariate probit writes as system 4.1.
We can now discuss whether the conditions for equal selection on observables and unob-
servables hold in our case. Variables that determine whether a person is unemployed at a point
in time are diverse. We can consider them to be numerous and pertaining to dierent domains.
Those domains are the personal characteristics determining skills (educational background, ex-
perience, other traits such as personal motivation), the characteristics of the local labor market,
the sector of activity and the type of position in previous job, the social network of the per-
son and personal characteristics that might serve as a basis for discrimination. Our covariates
cover those dierent domains: education and age relate to skills and experience, nationality may
generate discrimination, occupational status gives a proxy for the type of employment, while
16the spouse's educational level and nationality are proxies for the quality of the social network.
However, it seems likely that those variables are strong determinants of unemployment proba-
bility. Moreover, age, occupation and education of the individual and education of his spouse
are very important in determining the household's income, and therefore neighborhood choice.
The condition of equal selection on unobservables and observables seems therefore too strong in
our case. However, Altonji et al. (2002b) argue that in practice, this assumption can be viewed
as giving a lower bound of the treatment eect, while the biased probit estimate provides an
upper bound.11
We will therefore follow Altonji et al. (2005) and give three types of results:
 Sensitivity analysis: The bivariate probit is estimated with the correlation coecient being
constrained to dierent values, which serve as identication assumptions. This allows to
scan the estimated eect of the endogenous variable over dierent values of the correlation.
 Equal selection: We assume the equality of selection on observables and unobservables.
The likelihood of the bivariate probit is maximized under this constraint and a point
estimate of the neighborhood eect is obtained.
 Assessing the amount of selection on unobservables required to explain the probit estimate:
Following Altonji et al. (2005), one can formalize how large selection on unobservables is
relative to selection on observables by writing:
E(u1jy2 = 1)   E(u1jy2 = 0)
var(u1)
= 
E(X01jy2 = 1)   E(X01jy2 = 0)
var(X01)
(4.5)
This equation represents that the relationship between the treatment and the mean index
of unobservables that determine the outcome is  times as strong as the relationship
between the treatment and the mean index of observables, after adjustments for variances.
The condition of equality of selection on observables and unobservables (condition 4.4) is
equivalent to  = 1.
It is then possible to compute how large , that is the selection on unobservables relative to
the selection on the index of observables, would have to be for the naive estimate obtained
in the probit to be entirely explained by selection. Altonji et al. (2002b) show that under
11Krauth (2006) gives a formal demonstration of this idea in a slightly dierent case.
17this hypothesis:








with ~ y2 the residual of a regression of y2 on X.12
5 Results
Two kinds of results are presented in this section: results of the simultaneaous probit model with
exclusion restrictions in Section 5.1 and robustness checks based on the identication strategy
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) in Section 5.2.
5.1 Simultaneous probit model estimates
Table 4 presents marginal eects of the simultaneous probit of neighborhood deprivation (dened
here as the 25% most deprived neighborhoods) and unemployment for the whole sample with
the spouse's workplace as an instrument (columns 2-3) and for families with at least two children
with two dierent instrumentations. The rst one uses the spouse's workplace (columns 4-5),
whereas the second has two instruments: the spouse's workplace and the gender composition of
children (columns 6-7).
On the whole sample, the probability to live in a deprived neighborhood is inuenced by
the individual's and his spouse's nationality (column 3). Being of foreign nationality increases by
about 10 points the probability to live in a deprived neighborhood. Being of French nationality
born abroad increases this probability by 6 points. The eect of education level is quite strong
as well. Having no diploma or at most a lower secondary education raises the likelihood to be
in a deprived neighborhood. Note that the eect of the spouse's education is higher than that
of the individual: the possibility to have a second wage in the household and the level of this
wage particularly inuences residential choice. Finally, the professional category also markedly
12More precisely, let's note X
02 and ~ y2 the predicted value and residual of a regression of y2 on X, so that ~ y2
is orthogonal to X
02. Treating , the coecient of the endogenous, as if it were estimated by a linear regression
of the latent variable y

1 on y2 and X and supposing that the bias in the probit equation is the same as the one
based on an OLS estimation, the estimated coecient veries: plim ^  = +
var(y2)
var( ~ y2)[E(u1jy2 = 1) E(u1jy2 = 0)].
Replacing E(u1jy2 = 1)   E(u1jy2 = 0) by its expression from 4.5 and supposing that there is no endogenous
eect ( = 0), it is possible to solve for  (reminding that var(u1) = 1) which gives formula 4.6.
18impacts neighborhood choice, with the expected eect. We also observe the eect of the two
instruments, that were already commented in Section 4.2. Families with at least two children
behave in the same way, with an additional eect of age, younger families being more likely to
live in deprived neighborhoods.
There are not much dierences between the two samples as to the determinants of unem-
ployment (columns 2 and 4). The probability of unemployment has a non-monotonic relationship
with age, with a minimum at age 44. Compared to the intermediate profession category, indi-
viduals who were formerly independant workers or executives are less likely to be unemployed.
A slight eect of diploma is also observed, the low categories having higher probabilities of
unemployment. This eect appears both through the individual's and his spouse's education,
which can be attributed to the fact that the spouse's diploma is a proxy for the quality of the
social network of the household and to assortative mating. There is a rather strong eect of
the individual's nationality, which is more intense for individuals of foreign nationality than for
individuals of French nationality born in France.
Finally, we observe that the coecient of neighborhood type is unsignicant whatever
the sample and for the two instrumentations in the case of families with two children and
more. By comparison, a probit estimation of unemployment yields a marginal eect of living
in a deprived neighborhood of 2.1 probability points on the whole sample (column 2 of Table
3) and 2.6 probability points on the sample of families with children (column 4 of Table 3),
which is comparable in magnitude to the eect of being French born abroad. Of course, we
know that this eect is a naive estimate of the real neighborhood eect, because the single
probit estimation does not control for the endogeneity of neighborhood type. This naive eect
completely disappears once the endogeneity of residential location is accounted for. Note that
the estimated coecient is even negative on the whole sample, which, as will be explained in the
next section, is consistent with the high positive value of the residuals' correlation coecient.
However, neither the neighborhood coecient, nor the correlation coecient are signicant in
any of the three models.
In summary, the estimated results for the whole sample and for the subsample with
children are consistent, showing an absence of eect of living in a deprived neighborhood on
unemployment. It is important to recall that our instrumentation relies on two instruments
having very dierent logics and that passed the instrument validity test run on the sample of
19families with at least two children. Moreover, the GMM estimation of the linear probability
model allows to calculate the Stock-Wright statistic, which is a test of the two joint hypotheses
that the instruments are valid and that the coecient of the endogenous variable is null (Baum
et al., 2003). For the three estimations, the Stock-Wright statistic shows that these hypotheses
can not be rejected at any conventional level (Table 3). This result is useful in particular for the
whole sample, for which it provides a formal test of exogeneity of the only instrument available
in this case and an additional result in favor of the absence of eect of neighborhood deprivation
on unemployment probability.
In order to establish more rmly our results, we provide in the following robustness checks
that have two goals: (i) to use a completely dierent identication strategy that does not rely
on the quality of instruments; (ii) to explore the robustness of our main result to a dierent
neighborhood classication and to a focus on dierent subpopulations. Indeed, even if there
is no eect of being in the 25% most deprived neighborhoods, would it be that concentrating
the analysis on the most deprived neighborhood gives a dierent result? Moreover, because the
intensity of neighborhood eects is likely to vary depending especially on education, we may
nd neighborhood eects on subsamples dened on the basis of educational levels. Note that
the subsample of families with two children and more was useful to have a second instrument
allowing to test for the validity of the spouse's workplace as an instrument. As the rest of our
analysis does not rely on instrumental variables, the following results concern the whole sample.
5.2 Analysis  a la Altonji
Table 5 presents in three dierent panels the results of the dierent identifying assumptions
presented in section 4.3, which consists in (i) estimating the eect of living in a deprived neigh-
borhood for dierent constraints on the value of the correlation coecient  (panel A), (ii)
estimating the neighborhood eect assuming the equality of selection on observables and un-
observables (panel B) and (iii) estimating what amount of selection on unobservables would
be needed, relative to the selection on observables, to completely explain the eect of deprived
neighborhood found in naive probits (panel C). This is done for three dierent neighborhood
classications (the baseline 25% classication as well as the 35% and 15% classications) and
for three educational samples: the whole sample (10,473 individuals), the low-educated (ed-
ucation up to A-level; 5,737 individuals) and the higher-educated (university level diploma;
204,736 individuals). This gives nine combinations of neighborhood classication and educational
subsamples, which correspond to the dierent columns of Table 5.
5.2.1 Sensitivity to correlation in unobservables
Estimated coecients of the neighborhood variable corresponding to a correlation coecient
varying between 0.00 and 0.25 are presented in panel A of Table 5. Assuming that unobservables
determining the two outcomes are not correlated (i.e.  = 0) corresponds to the probit estimate
and yields in the nine cases positive eects for deprived neighborhood, as already observed in
Table 3. As expected, assuming a higher correlation of unobservables decreases the estimated
eect of neighborhood in all the cases we consider. For the whole sample and whatever the
neighborhood classication, the eect of neighborhood type vanishes when the correlation is
increased from 0.05 to 0.1. We even observe that imposing a correlation above 0.15 yields
negative marginal eects. This observation is consistent with the sorting of individuals into
neighborhood types. Indeed, imposing a high positive correlation of the error terms assumes
that the individuals that have unobserved characteristics that favor the location in deprived
neighborhoods also have unobservables that increase their unemployment probability. For this
to be consistent with a moderate probit marginal eect, it has to be that the neighborhood type
itself has a favorable eect on unemployment. In other words, the higher the sorting based on
unobservables, the lower is the real eect of neighborhood for a given probit estimate, up to a
negative eect.
It is also worth noting that the estimated neighborhood eect varies monotonically with
the correlation coecient. This result shows that it will be possible, as suggested by Altonji et
al. (2002b), to build a condence interval for the neighborhood eect based on assumptions as
to the domain covered by the correlation of unobservables.
Focusing more particularly on the dierences between the two educational subsamples, we
rst note that the neighborhood type coecient varies with respect to the subsamples and with
the neighborhood classication within each subsample. However, their standard deviations do
not permit to make any conclusion as to the dierences between these estimates, as condence
intervals of the point estimates overlap. Furthermore, we expect that working on subsamples
dened based on education decreases the share of explanatory power of the model that is due
21to observable characteristics and therefore gives more weight to unobservables. As a result,
the positive eect of neighborhood type estimated on these two subsamples is expected, when
imposing some correlation on unobservables, to disappear more quickly than for the whole
sample. This is indeed what is observed in our results. In particular, the eect of living in
the 15% more deprived neighborhoods for the low educated is divided by almost three with a
0.05 correlation compared to the probit estimate. This means that the 2.1 marginal eect given
by the probit model in this case (Table 5, column 6) is very possibly entirely due to the eect
of selection on unobservables. This is true for the two educational subsamples, whatever the
neighborhood classication retained. The only exception concerns the highly educated in the
15% most deprived neighborhoods, for whom a higher correlation is required for the 4.0 marginal
eect to be explained by selection based on unobservables. But the eect still vanishes at a low
level of correlation, actually between 0.05 and 0.1.
In summary, this sensitivity analysis shows that a small correlation of unobservables
aecting the two outcomes of interest would be sucient to produce the neighborhood eect that
is estimated based on probit models. This result is robust with respect to subsamples dened
based on education and to the particular threshold used for the neighborhood classication.
However, the actual magnitude of the correlation of unobservables is of course unknown. This
is why, following Altonji et al. (2005), we continue the analysis by using the amount of selection
on observables as a benchmark for the amount of selection on unobservables.
5.2.2 Assuming equal selection on unobservables and observables
We consider here the assumption of equal selection into neighborhood types based on observables
and unobservables. Panel B of Table 5 gives the neighborhood marginal eect for the bivariate
probit (equation 4.1) estimated under the constraint  = Cov(X02;X01)=V ar(X01) and the
resulting correlation coecient. The estimated correlation coecients are high, reecting the
high level of correlation in the explained part of the two outcomes, neighborhood type and
unemployment. This ensues from the high level of urban segregation along age, education,
nationality and occupational status, which are all important determinants of unemployment
as well. Imposing such a high level of correlation of unobservables yields, in conformity with
the results of the sensitivity analysis, negative coecients for the neighborhood type in the
unemployment equation. Such a negative eect of neighborhood deprivation is of course unlikely
22to be real and reects rather that such a high level of correlation is unlikely to hold in the data.
As developed in Section 4, the assumption of equal selection is in our case an extreme
hypothesis. Indeed, as our observed variables include age, education and nationality, we can
think that very important determinants of neighborhood choice are already taken into account.
As a result, we think that the real amount of selection on unobservables is likely to be lower than
the selection on observables, but still strictly positive. Given this and given that the previous
subsection showed that the eect of neighborhood decreases monotonically with the correlation
of unobservables, one can consider the neighborhood eect estimated under the assumption
of equal selection as a lower bound of the real neighborhood eect and the estimate obtained
with the probit model, which considers that there is no selection based on unobservables, as
the upper bound. All the hypotheses between these two benchmarks can be considered. It
is then important to note that in the nine cases considered in Table 5, the lower value for
the eect of neighborhood is negative, which means that the zero value, which is the result of
the IV identication method, is in the condence interval for the value of the neighborhood
eect constructed based on the two extreme hypotheses of equal selection and no selection.
Furthermore, a strictly positive eect of neighborhood type holds only if the level of selection
on unobservables is low. In the following, a more informal analysis is carried, that assesses the
amount of selection on unobservables required to explain the probit eect.
5.2.3 Amount of correlation of unobservables required for the probit neighborhood
eect to be entirely due to the endogeneity bias
We nally turn to the last robustness check, which consists in evaluating how strong the selection
on unobservables needs to be, relative to the selection on observables, so as to discard any eect
of neighborhood type. The results of this step are in the last panel of Table 5.
The two previous series of results showed, for instance for the whole sample and the
15% classication, that a 0.10 correlation of unobservables () is enough to cancel out the probit
marginal eect and that the correlation in the indexes of observables (Cov(X02;X01)=V ar(X01))
is 0.81. Results for the other classications and for the two subsamples are similar. Accord-
ingly, it is expected that a level of selection on unobservables small in front of the selection on
observables is enough to cancel out the eect of neighborhood type.
23Consistent with this observation, we nd that a very low level of selection on unobservables
relatively to the selection on observables is enough to explain the positive probit estimate of
neighborhood type in all the cases. For the whole sample and whatever the neighborhood
classication, a selection on unobservables as low as 6% of the selection on observables is enough
to produce the estimated probit eect. Only in the case of the low educated sample and the
35% neighborhood classication is the quantity of required selection on unobservables slightly
above 10% of the selection on observables. This remains however low, and allows us to conclude
that this result is a strong argument against the existence of any eect of neighborhood type on
unemployment probability in our data.
5.3 Results synthesis
Our results show that being in a deprived neighborhood could increase the probability of un-
employment by 2.1 points if one were to take the probit estimate at face value. However, this
estimate clearly suers from an endogeneity bias and can only be considered as a higher bound
of the real neighborhood eect. The lower bound of the estimated eect is obtained when con-
sidering that the correlation of unobservables inuencing neighborhood type and unemployment
is as high as the correlation of observable determinants. This is of course an extreme assump-
tion, that leads to an implausible negative eect of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment
probability. In any case, the real neighborhood eect is on this interval, which contains the null
value.
For example, for the whole sample and the 15% neighborhood classication again, the
naive probit marginal eect is 2.5 probability points. The sensitivity analysis shows that this
eect decreases rapidly when the correlation is xed to higher values. Assuming as much selection
on unobservables as on observables, that is 0.82, leads to an implausible negative eect of -16.3
probability points. The real neighborhood eect lies on this interval. It is very likely that even
if not as high as the correlation on observables, some selection on unobservables happens, and
the sensitivity analysis shows that a correlation of unobservables slightly above 0.05 produces
a null marginal eect of neighborhood type. This set of results is sucient to conclude that
being located in the 15% most deprived neighborhoods in Lyon has no eect on unemployment
probability. The results in the other cases are of similar magnitude.
24Finally, the informal computation suggested by Altonji et al. (2005) reported in section
5.2.3 shows that the correlation of unobservables being only 5 to 10% of the correlation of
observables is enough to explain the positive eect estimated in probit models. Such a low level
of correlation is very likely to happen in such a context, although these results per se are not
enough to formally reject a positive eect of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment.
Consistently, the results of the simultaneous probit model, of which identication relies on
a valid instrumentation, also points to a null eect of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment
probability. All these results give converging elements based on dierent points of view. As a
result, we are allowed to conclude that we were not able to demonstrate the existence of any
neighborhood eect on unemployment in Lyon.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to examine how unemployment probabilities are inuenced by
location in a deprived neighborhood in a French city (Lyon). However, estimating properly the
eect of neighborhood composition on unemployment is a dicult task, because labor-market
outcomes and residential choices are intrinsically related. Therefore, it raises the issue of location
choice endogeneity which, if not corrected for, is likely to bias the estimates of neighborhood
eects. No perfect solution to this problem exists at present.
In this context, the main contribution of our work is to use two dierent identication
strategies, which provide converging results. First, we estimate a simultaneous model of two
probit equations, one for unemployment probability, and the second for location in a deprived
neighborhood, allowing for non zero correlation between the error terms of both equations. Iden-
tication is achieved classically through exclusion restrictions on the basis of two instruments:
the gender composition of household's children and an indicator variable for the spouse working
in the eastern outskirts of the agglomeration. Results show that the naive detrimental eect
found in simple probits completely disappears with the simultaneous probit estimates, whatever
the instrument used and for both the whole sample and the sample of families with at least
two children. Second, we estimate the same simultaneous model, without exclusion restrictions
but imposing dierent constraints on the correlation between error terms, which permit point
identication of neighborhood eects. This second strategy amounts to making hypotheses as
25to the degree of selection into deprived neighborhoods based on unobservables. Using dierent
hypotheses as to this selection leads to the same result as the IV method: under reasonable
assumptions as to this selection, it is not possible to demonstrate the existence of any signicant
eect of neighborhood deprivation on unemployment probability. Sensitivity analyses based
on dierent subsamples dened on the basis of educational level and dierent neighborhood
classications also yield converging results.
In conclusion, our results do not provide any support to the hypothesis according to which
living in a deprived neighborhood increases unemployment probabilities, once the endogeneity
of residential choices is dealt with. It therefore highlights the importance of properly taking en-
dogeneity into account in neighborhood eects studies. Besides, our results converge with those
obtained in quasi-experimental designs which do not show any signicant eect of residential
moves on labor-market outcomes (Kling et al., 2007). Our result is also consistent with ndings
by Bolster et al. (2007), who show the absence of neighborhood eect on income dynamics,
using panel data.
This result suggests that neighborhood eects found in naive models, as simple probit
estimates, are in fact entirely due to the sorting into deprived neighborhoods of individuals
with unobserved characteristics that are detrimental in nding a job. However, this result does
not mean that public policies targeting specic neighborhoods, instead of specic individuals,
are unneeded. Indeed, as highlighted by Bolster et al. (2007), given the high level of spatial
sorting of households by socioeconomic category and also with a smaller intensity by unobserved
characteristics, targeting specic areas is probably an easy way of targeting specic groups of
individuals. Moreover, whereas it seems from our results that neighborhood deprivation has
no eect on unemployment, it could well have an eect on other outcomes, such as adolescent
educational outcomes or health.
Finally, we would like to stress the methodological contribution of our work. Indeed,
neighborhood eects studies based on cross-section data are hampered by the diculty of nding
valid instruments. We hope that our analysis will show that it is possible, by exploiting the
complementarity between the IV method and the  a la Altonji approach, to provide robust results
in this research area. This is a new track of research, that should reveal particularly fruitful in
a domain where the identication issue is so crucial, and in contexts where quasi-experimental
situations are scarce.
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31Appendix
Factor 1 Factor 2
Eigenvalue 4.19 4.61
Percent of variance explained 41.86% 46.15%
Loadings
% families with foreign household head 0.816 -0.399
% monoparental households 0.793 -0.120
% pop. with at most lower secondary education 0.510 -0.824
% pop. with high school nal diploma -0.291 0.949
% pop. with a university degree -0.212 0.968
% executives -0.244 0.931
% blue-collars 0.486 -0.820
% unemployed workers 0.921 -0.308
% unemployed workers since more than one year 0.908 -0.314
% unemployed workers aged under 25 0.730 -0.437
Only factors with eigenvalues superior or equal to 1 were retained.
Table A.1: List of variables used in the principal component analysis and their contributions to
factors
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Figure A.1: Location of Eastern outskirts for the spouse's workplace variable
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Figure 1: Percentage of unemployed workers within labor-force participants
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Figure 2: Neighborhood typology
35Deprived neighborhoods Other neighborhoods Total
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
Public housing units (%) 51.9 0.0 98.5 11.1 0.0 70.9 21.3
Demography
Foreign household heads (%) 23.1 0.0 56.9 6.9 0.0 20.8 10.9
Lone-parent families (%) 18.9 7.1 33.3 11.8 0.0 28.6 13.5
Education levels
At most secondary edu. (%) 54.8 35.9 69.7 35.1 19.2 51.2 40.1
University degree (%) 10.6 4.0 34.9 29.3 7.2 54.3 24.6
Unemployment
Unemployed workers (%) 20.3 9.8 37.3 9.6 4.0 20.4 12.3
Unemp. for more than 1 year (%) 11.1 4.6 22.0 4.7 1.3 11.2 6.3
Occupational status
Blue-collars (%) 38.0 14.2 62.9 16.2 2.8 46.0 21.7
Executives (%) 5.5 0.0 24.5 21.0 2.8 47.6 17.1
Population 2369 270 5041 2443 247 5730 2425
Total population 322,254 994,540 1,316,794
Number of neighborhoods 136 407 543
Table 1: Mean characteristics of neighborhood by type (25% most deprived neighborhoods versus
others)
3625% most deprived Other Total
neighborhoods neighborhoods
% of % in % of % in % of % in
category unempl. category unempl. category unempl.
Number of observations 2215 11.1 8258 5.2 10,473 6.4
Personal characteristics
Age
=< 30 15.6 11.8 14.4 5.8 14.6 7.2
> 30 and =< 45 47.2 11.9 47.1 4.8 47.2 6.3
> 45 37.2 9.7 38.5 5.4 38.2 6.3
Nationality
French born in France 64.6 7.8 84.7 4.4 80.5 5.0
French born abroad 13.8 11.1 9.0 7.0 10.0 8.2
Foreign nationality 21.6 20.7 6.3 12.6 9.5 16.5
Education
No diploma 26.3 16.5 10.2 8.4 13.6 11.7
At most lower sec. edu. 16.6 11.4 11.7 7.2 12.7 8.4
Vocational training 33.9 8.5 27.0 5.3 28.4 6.1
High school nal diploma 9.9 9.1 13.5 4.6 12.7 5.3
University diploma 13.2 7.9 37.7 3.8 32.5 4.1
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker 6.6 7.5 11.3 2.8 10.3 3.4
Executive 7.8 6.9 28.9 3.2 24.4 3.5
Intermediate professions 18.7 7.5 27.5 5.4 25.6 5.7
Oce worker 12.4 9.8 9.0 4.9 9.7 6.3
Blue-collar 54.5 13.6 23.3 8.6 29.9 10.5
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 26.4 14.4 9.0 10.1 12.7 11.9
At most lower sec. edu. 19.1 12.7 14.7 5.8 15.7 7.6
Vocational training 27.2 9.6 20.9 4.9 22.2 6.1
High school nal diploma 11.5 8.6 17.6 4.0 16.3 4.7
University diploma 15.7 7.8 37.8 4.5 33.1 4.8
Nationality
French born in France 67.0 8.6 86.0 4.5 82.0 5.3
French born abroad 12.1 13.0 8.2 6.3 9.1 8.2
Foreign nationality 20.1 17.7 5.8 13.0 8.9 15.3
Household characteristics
Girl-Boy (a) 23.0 12.5 25.2 4.3 24.7 6.1
Spouse works in eastern outskirts 23.5 7.1 15.1 4.9 16.8 5.6
(a) For households having at least 2 children
Table 2: Summary statistics of the estimation sample
37All individuals >= 2 children
Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb. Neighb.
Deprived neighborhood (25%) 0.0213*** 0.0265***
(0.0063) (0.0082)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0808*** -0.0448 -0.0840** -0.3066*** -0.3038***
(0.0179) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0735) (0.0734)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0092*** 0.0032 0.0092** 0.0325*** 0.0321***
(0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0560*** 0.0942*** 0.0711*** 0.0895*** 0.0900***
(0.0133) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0293) (0.0294)
French born abroad 0.0200** 0.0600*** 0.0368*** 0.0714*** 0.0715***
(0.0088) (0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Education
No diploma 0.0176 0.0582*** 0.0161 0.0414* 0.0413
(0.0118) (0.0178) (0.0145) (0.0251) (0.0251)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0186* 0.0435** 0.0131 0.0280 0.0277
(0.0111) (0.0181) (0.0143) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Vocational training 0.0018 0.0229 0.0002 0.0185 0.0180
(0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0233) (0.0233)
High school nal diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0017 -0.0273* 0.0148 -0.0134 -0.0143
(0.0093) (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0251) (0.0250)
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker -0.0291*** -0.0473*** -0.0191** -0.0456** -0.0454**
(0.0063) (0.0140) (0.0094) (0.0222) (0.0223)
Executive -0.0188*** -0.0677*** -0.0146 -0.0698*** -0.0696***
(0.0067) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Oce worker -0.0079 0.0652*** -0.0026 0.1214*** 0.1228***
(0.0079) (0.0176) (0.0116) (0.0277) (0.0278)
Blue-collar 0.0099 0.1046*** 0.0100 0.1313*** 0.1325***
(0.0072) (0.0146) (0.0097) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0197* 0.1353*** 0.0129 0.1551*** 0.1538***
(0.0104) (0.0200) (0.0136) (0.0282) (0.0282)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0160* 0.0761*** 0.0111 0.0880*** 0.0866***
(0.0092) (0.0160) (0.0127) (0.0266) (0.0266)
Vocational training 0.0067 0.0768*** 0.0055 0.0902*** 0.0889***
(0.0078) (0.0145) (0.0105) (0.0238) (0.0238)
High school nal diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0118 -0.0141 0.0009 -0.0244 -0.0247
(0.0080) (0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0166 0.1188*** 0.0172 0.1426*** 0.1407***
(0.0114) (0.0232) (0.0149) (0.0298) (0.0296)
French born abroad 0.0161* 0.0675*** 0.0100 0.0777*** 0.0773***
(0.0089) (0.0181) (0.0102) (0.0238) (0.0237)
Instruments




Test on instruments from GMM estimation of linear probability models
First stage F-test [p-value] 28.57 [0.000] 23.32 [0.000] 12.25 [0.000]
Stock-Wright [p-value] 1.90 [0.168] 0.00 [0.948] 0.53 [0.769]
Overid. test Hansen J [p-value] - - 0.530 [0.466]
Log-likelihood -2349 -4604 -978.4 -2143 -2141
Pseudo-R2 0.0597 0.148 0.0999 0.192 0.192
Number of observations 10,473 4849
Notes: ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in parentheses give standard errors, corrected for within-neighborhood dependencies.
All models use 25% most deprived neighborhoods as neighborhood variable and are for all individuals in the
sample (low and high educated together).
Table 3: Marginal eects from simple probits of unemployment and location in deprived neigh-
borhoods
38All individuals >= 2 children
Exclusions Spouse's workplace Spouse's workplace Spouse's workplace
& Girl-Boy
Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb. Unemp. Neighb.
Deprived neighborhood (25%) -0.0329 0.0106 0.0026
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0306)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0852*** -0.0465 -0.0888** -0.3080*** -0.0918** -0.3055***
(0.0196) (0.0372) (0.0391) (0.0735) (0.0398) (0.0733)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0096*** 0.0035 0.0097** 0.0327*** 0.0100** 0.0324***
(0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0084)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0672*** 0.0931*** 0.0734*** 0.0892*** 0.0748*** 0.0895***
(0.0171) (0.0203) (0.0213) (0.0293) (0.0216) (0.0293)
French born abroad 0.0257** 0.0590*** 0.0384*** 0.0709*** 0.0394*** 0.0707***
(0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0134) (0.0208) (0.0137) (0.0208)
Education
No diploma 0.0231* 0.0577*** 0.0169 0.0412 0.0174 0.0411
(0.0131) (0.0179) (0.0144) (0.0251) (0.0146) (0.0252)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0224* 0.0434** 0.0135 0.0278 0.0138 0.0275
(0.0119) (0.0182) (0.0143) (0.0267) (0.0143) (0.0267)
Vocational training 0.0037 0.0223 0.0005 0.0183 0.0006 0.0178
(0.0090) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.0234) (0.0112) (0.0233)
High school nal diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0028 -0.0279* 0.0147 -0.0136 0.0147 -0.0146
(0.0096) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0251) (0.0145) (0.0250)
Occupational status
Farmer or independent worker -0.0323*** -0.0478*** -0.0197** -0.0457** -0.0201** -0.0455**
(0.0069) (0.0139) (0.0093) (0.0222) (0.0094) (0.0222)
Executive -0.0225*** -0.0680*** -0.0153 -0.0700*** -0.0158* -0.0699***
(0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0199) (0.0095) (0.0199)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Oce worker -0.0040 0.0647*** -0.0009 0.1214*** 0.0001 0.1228***
(0.0092) (0.0177) (0.0124) (0.0278) (0.0128) (0.0278)
Blue-collar 0.0185* 0.1042*** 0.0123 0.1313*** 0.0136 0.1324***
(0.0105) (0.0145) (0.0114) (0.0222) (0.0118) (0.0222)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0314** 0.1354*** 0.0156 0.1555*** 0.0171 0.1545***
(0.0148) (0.0199) (0.0156) (0.0283) (0.0161) (0.0283)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0222* 0.0756*** 0.0125 0.0882*** 0.0134 0.0868***
(0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0136) (0.0266) (0.0139) (0.0266)
Vocational training 0.0123 0.0765*** 0.0069 0.0904*** 0.0077 0.0891***
(0.0097) (0.0145) (0.0114) (0.0238) (0.0117) (0.0238)
High school nal diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0115 -0.0143 0.0009 -0.0240 0.0008 -0.0241
(0.0082) (0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0218) (0.0109) (0.0218)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0267* 0.1191*** 0.0199 0.1426*** 0.0215 0.1406***
(0.0140) (0.0231) (0.0159) (0.0297) (0.0163) (0.0295)
French born abroad 0.0218** 0.0674*** 0.0113 0.0776*** 0.0120 0.0772***
(0.0108) (0.0181) (0.0107) (0.0238) (0.0110) (0.0237)
Instruments




Correlation of residuals 0.301 (0.1932) 0.0853 (0.1668) 0.133 (0.1802)
LR test (12 = 0) [p-value] 2.135 [0.144] 0.259 [0.611] 0.528 [0.467]
Log-likelihood -6952 -3121 -3119
Pseudo-R2 0.120 0.165 0.166
Number of observations 10473 4849 4849
Notes: ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in parentheses give standard errors, corrected for within-neighborhood dependencies.
All models use 25% most deprived neighborhoods as neighborhood variable and are for all individuals in the sample (low
and high educated together).
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